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Prior to the twentieth century, States solved disputes among them-
selves primarily through the use of force - by waging war against one
another. There were specific rules about how the war was to be con-
ducted, but few, if any, regulations governed what constituted a legal
basis to go to war in the first place.I All of this has clearly changed as
the U.N. Charter enshrines the prohibition on the use of force and
customary law develops around the prohibition. Thus, States must
utilize alternative methods of dispute resolution that do not explicitly
entail the use of force in order to address conflicts between themselves.
To comply with the terms of the Charter, States have sought out
methods of action that would exert influence over-some would use
the more value-laden terminology "coerce"--other States to accept
their positions in the international arena. Many such methods exist,
including the use of diplomatic persuasion and condemnation and ap-
peals to individuals and private organizations. However, the method
by far most frequently and most effectively utilized by States is the
employment of economic measures to achieve foreign policy goals.
This form of State action, which I will describe as "economic di-
plomacy," has often been controversial in the past, initially because of
the schism between the East and West, and later because of the con-
flict between the North and South. Many developing and Second
World States have asserted that several forms of what they typically
described as "economic coercion" were contrary to international law
in much the same way as is the exercise of the use of force.2 Typically,
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. (1991).
1. Werner Meng, War, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282, 282-83
(Rudolf Bernhard ed., 1982).
2. The Indian delegate to a U.N. special committee argued for adoption of an interpretation
of the U.N. Charter that included a definition of the term "force" as including actions other than
armed force, presumably including the use of economic diplomacy. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OP-
ERATION BETWEEN STATES, SUMMARY RECORD OF THE THIRD MEETING, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.I 19/SR.3, at 6-8 (1964). For a general discussion of the role of Third World versus First
World States on this issue, see Stephen C. Neff, Boycott and The Law of Nations: Economic
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developing nations characterized the use of economic diplomacy
(often by First World States against those of the Second or Third
World) 3 as a form of aggression or as a violation of the prohibition of
intervention in the domestic affairs of other sovereign States. First
World States accused of such action have generally either categorically
denied the illegality of their exercise of economic diplomacy in inter-
national affairs or have sought exculpatory justification for their con-
duct. In at least one instance, however, this relationship was turned
on its head, with the First World States arguing that the use of a par-
ticular type of economic diplomacy was illegal while Third World
States argued that their actions were within the bounds of legality.
4
The dispute concerning the legality of the use of economic diplo-
macy has not been limited to the often self-serving claims of State ac-
tors. The community of international legal scholars has conducted a
very active and wide-ranging debate on the legality of the exercise of
economic diplomacy as well. 5 Unfortunately, this debate has provided
no clear answer to the question of legality of such action. Moreover,
most of the scholarship that has appeared in this area was written be-
tween the mid-1960s and the late 1970s at the height of great turmoil
Warfare and Modern International Law in Historical Perspective, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 113
(1988).
See James A. Boorman II, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon
and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 INT'L L. & ECON. 205 (1974); Hartmut Brosche, The Arab
Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and the
Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1974); Paul S. Dempsey, Economic
Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American
Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 (1977) for a discussion of the general debate
concerning the application of the doctrine against the use of force as applied to the exercise of
economic sanctions in international law.
3. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION: AGENDA OF
THE FIRST MEETING, U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.1 (1953).
4. This action was the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo placed by the Organization of Arab Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) against States that provided support to Israel. See discus-
sion infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
5. For strong positions generally condemning the use of economic diplomacy under interna-
tional law, see, e.g., Brosche, supra note 2; Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil
Weapon - A Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974); Yehuda Z. Blum,
Economic Boycotts in International Law, 12 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 5 (1977).
For intermediate positions on the subject, see, e.g., Derek W. Bowett, International Law and
Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245 (1976); Hans-Gerd Kausch, Boycotts for Non-eco-
nomic Reasons in International Trade: International and German Law Aspects, 48 NORDISK
TIDSSKRIFr FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 26 (1977); Richard B. Lillich, The Status of Economic
Coercion Under International Law: United Nations Norms, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17 (1977); Com-
ment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of
the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974).
Finally, for arguments that the use of such means are generally legal under international law,
see, e.g., DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 336-47 (1985); Richard B. Bilder, Com-
ments on the Legality of the Arab Oil Boycott, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 41 (1977); Tom J. Farer,
Political and Economic Coercion, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1985) (editorial comment); J. Dapray
Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 187 (1974).
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in the international arena and of the ascendancy of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order (NIEO).6 The legal issue has been largely ig-
nored during recent years while the use of such economic diplomacy
has attained an even more important position in the toolbox of the
diplomat.
Therefore, the international legal community must once again ex-
amine economic diplomacy to clarify the important question of its le-
gality. This Note will give an analysis of the scholarship that has
appeared in this field, as well as the actual practice of States, to deter-
mine if any fixed rules have been established in this area, and if so,
what they are. It will do so by looking at the debates that have taken
place concerning the application of the language and underlying prin-
ciples of the U.N. Charter in order to see if these norms of State action
prohibit economic diplomacy. The Note will then look to the actual
practice of States to determine whether it provides adequate evidence
of opiniojuris to find regulation of the challenged conduct as a princi-
ple of general customary international law. Finally, the Note will seek
to compare the rules that actually have been solidified in international
law with those that ideally fit within the larger policy schema of the
post-Charter international system in order to find how there may be
improvement in the future law of this area.
One preliminary matter of terminology will be discussed for the
purpose of clarity. In much of the literature in this field, authors use
the names of various types of economic activity almost interchangea-
bly though the activities are, in fact, quite different from one another
in form and substance. Among the types of economic activity that are
generally discussed as examples of economic diplomacy are embargo, 7
boycott, 8 economic sanction, "economic warfare,"9 and blockade. 10
For the purposes of this Note, the most important distinction between
these terms is the difference between actions that are essentially sup-
plemental to the exercise of the use of force and those that stand alone
in the sense that they are not taken in support of, or in the contempla-
tion of, the use of armed force. Among the types of economic activity
6. See Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order, 16
VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1976) for a general discussion of the relevance of the ascendancy of the
NIEO to the international legal debate concerning the exercise of economic diplomacy.
7. See M.S. DAOUDI & M.S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 3
(1983) for a good definition of this term.
8. For a discussion of the pre-Charter international legal norms that grew up around the use
of the boycott in international relations, see Charles C. Hyde & Louis B. Wehle, The Boycott in
Foreign Affairs, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1933); H. Lauterpacht, Boycott in International Relations,
14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 125 (1933).




that are supplemental to the use of such force are exercises of blockade
and "economic warfare." These activities imply that the use of force is
either involved in the execution of the economic action itself (i.e.,
blockade) or that the economic action is itself used in order to support
the concurrent or planned execution of the use of force (e.g., war).
Yet, no use of armed force is either explicit or implicit in the exer-
cise of the policies of boycott, embargo, or economic sanction, nor are
these actions typically a prelude to the use of this type of force. These
activities are, in terms of their execution, of a purely nonforceful char-
acter and nothing about them implies the imminent application of the
use of force. The boycott is often associated with the actions of private
parties,1 ' especially within the domestic context; however, only those
boycotts that are mandated by State action are relevant for the pur-
poses of this Note. A boycott is a State-mandated refusal to allow the
purchase of goods and services originating from a certain target State.
The term "embargo" is the exact opposite of the concept of the boy-
cott. During an embargo, the State forbids goods or services to be
exported for the use of the target State or its nationals. Finally, the
term "economic sanction" refers to a broader category of State action,
of which the other two - embargo and boycott - are subcategories,
affecting the economic interests of another State. In the exercise of a
general economic sanction, the State may be doing more than simply
controlling the economic actions of those persons under its jurisdiction
- it may also take actions within the international community that
are directed toward the target State's economic interests. Examples
include a country seizing the assets of another, discontinuing foreign
aid that it had promised, or blocking another's access to international
credit institutions.
This Note does not consider the issue of collective sanctions as
provided for in the U.N. Charter at the call of the Security Council
under Article 41. Instead, it discusses the actions of States, individu-
ally or collectively, that are not sanctioned by such international bod-
ies. Moreover, this Note will not specifically address State actions that
are taken to gain an advantage in the terms of trade. On this issue, it
is very difficult to distinguish the actions of States that are directed
toward advancing its economic goals but not its political agenda. An
inherent overlap exists in these areas of State action that cannot be
avoided because there is no clear distinction between economic and
11. See id.; Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 126-27. Moreover, since these types of actions, if
taken by private parties without State encouragement, are performed by actors beyond the reach
of the subjects of international law, their conduct may not be prohibited by such a norm. Derek
W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1972).
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political spheres in the reality of international relations. Despite these
obvious difficulties, this Note will attempt to focus on those actions
that would traditionally be seen as advancing primarily the "foreign
policy" of the State rather than its relative economic prosperity.
1. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION ON THE
EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
A. The View of the Classical Positivist Publicists of International
Law
Given that the U.N. Charter reflects a true break with the history
of the regulation of States' interaction with each other in the interna-
tional arena, most of the discussion in this Note will focus on post-
Charter international law. However, it is important to understand the
origins of the current law in this area in order to understand the true
nature of the present situation. The classical positivist commentators
of international law saw very few restrictions on State action, and
those that they did find were built upon the notion of consent of the
States themselves.12 The area of international economic action was, in
particular, virtually beyond the realm of international legal regulation
according to classical international law publicists.' 3 As an example,
de Vattel stated rather categorically that
[i]t depends on the will of any nation to carry on commerce with an-
other, or let it alone. If she be willing to allow this to one, it depends on
the nation to permit it under such conditions as she shall think proper.
For in permitting another nation to trade with her, she grants that other
a right; and every one is at liberty to affix what conditions he pleases to a
right which he grants of his own accord. 14
Thus, it is quite clear that no State was under an affirmative legal obli-
gation to allow trade between itself and any other State under the
classical law of nations as seen by these positivist thinkers.
De Vattel stated further that the trade between nations was not
susceptible to the formation of binding international legal norms based
upon custom because,
it depends on the will of each nation to carry on commerce with another,
or not to carry it on .... the right of commerce is evidently a right of
mere ability (/us merae facultatis), a simple power, and consequently is
imprescriptible. Thus, although two nations have treated together, with-
12. See MARTrI KOSKENNIEMi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS 106-17 (1989) for a general discussion of the positivist move-
ment in international law.
13. Stephen C. Neff, Economic Warfare in Contemporary International Law: Three Schools
of Thought Evaluated According to an Historical Method, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67, 70 (1989).
14. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 39 (Joseph Chitty trans., 1861).
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out interruption, during a century, this long usage does not give any
right to either of them; nor is the one obliged on this account to suffer
the other to come and sell its merchandises, or to buy others: - they
both preserve the double right of prohibiting the entrance of foreign mer-
chandise, and of selling their own wherever people are willing to buy
them. 15
This scholarship reveals that virtually no customary law constraint on
the exercise of economic diplomacy existed under the classical law of
nations. However, it was quite clear that States could contract with
one another by entering into treaties in order to protect themselves
from the exercise of economic diplomacy that was adverse to their
interests. Many States availed themselves of the opportunity in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by entering into Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) with their important
trading partners. 16 Yet, treaty enactment was basically the only pro-
tection that States had against the exercise of adverse forms of eco-
nomic diplomacy--except, of course, the ultimate threat of the use of
force which always remained open to them.
This classical system of regulating State action began to erode at
the end of World War I and was thoroughly dismantled by the end of
World War II when the international community sought to change
fundamentally the way States interacted with one another.
B. The United Nations Charter
The most important international source of law that is relevant to
a discussion of the use of economic diplomacy in the postwar order is
the U.N. Charter. The Charter contains many provisions that are rel-
evant to this inquiry, but the one that has been discussed most fre-
quently in this debate has been Article 2. Article 2 provides in
pertinent part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated
in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles....
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in' such manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations. .... 17
It is this language of the Charter that many advocates of the illegality
15. Id. at 41.
16. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 29-30 (1987); Muir, supra note 5, at
200.
17. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3)-2(4).
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of the exercise of economic diplomacy have seized upon in order to
support their position.1 8 The argument is essentially that certain
forms of economic diplomacy are inherently "coercive" in character
and are thus proscribed by the purposes of the United Nations as set
forth in Article 2 of the Charter.1 9
Most of the discussion concerning the use of economic diplomacy
has focused on whether such activity constitutes "aggression," under
the U.N. Charter. This seems like a peculiar focus given the fact that
the portions of the Charter that directly proscribe certain types of ac-
tivities by Member States (i.e., Article 2) make no textual mention of
the prohibitions of actions that would amount to "aggression," but
rather refer to the use of force. However, the term "aggression" does
prominently appear in Article 39 of the Charter,20 which delineates
the Security Council's responsibilities and requires the Council to take
certain types of measures in opposition to actions it deems to consti-
tute aggression. Therefore, it is better to think of the issue in terms of
whether the use of economic diplomacy amounts to the "use of force"
acting against the sovereignty of another State than whether it
amounts to "aggression."
Scholars have tended over time to use the language in the Charter
relating to aggression as a basis to argue that economic diplomacy has
been abolished through the formation of a principle of international
law which, while not clearly covered by the language of the Charter,
has been prohibited by the general scheme and purpose of the instru-
ment.21 This line of argument has frequently resulted in a collapsing
of the notions of "aggression" and "use of force" as used in the various
Charter provisions so that they are treated nearly interchangeably.
22
While the present author does not advance this position, a sufficiently
large group of highly respected authorities have adopted it that the
18. For a general discussion of the legality of the use of economic diplomacy under Article 2
of the Charter, see Rex J. Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations Charter and the Use of
Military Force Against Economic Coercion, 17 TULSA L.J. 487, 491-97 (1982); Comment, supra
note 5, at 993-97.
19. Comment, supra note 5, at 1000-02.
20. Article 39 provides,
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
See infra notes 46-58 for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between "use of force"
and "aggression" and the attempts by the United Nations to define "aggression" as used in the
Charter.
21. Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5, at 413.
22. See, e.g., Brosche, supra note 2, at 22.
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view cannot be ignored. Moreover, while there may not be a unity of
meaning of the two terms as used within the Charter, there is some
utility to examining the various understandings of the meaning of the
term "aggression" to understand the legality of the exercise of certain
forms of economic diplomacy.
In analyzing the meaning of a particular international treaty provi-
sion, one must consider whether its language is ambiguous in any
way.23 The vast majority of treaty provisions could be described as
vague, and Article 2 is especially ambiguous because the Charter does
not define the term "force" and no clear and consistently held mean-
ing exists for the term within the international community. Therefore,
the analysis must make reference to the travaux prdparatoires of the
Charter in order to understand the commonly accepted meanings for
the terms used within the document.
At the time of the drafting of the Charter, the Brazilian delegate to
the drafting committee attempted to proscribe explicitly the use of cer-
tain economic measures in Article 2 of the Charter. This amendment
proposed that the Article read:
All Members of the Organization shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or the use of force and from the threat or use of
economic measures in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
Organization.
24
The provision was, however, not included within the final text of the
instrument at the overwhelming vote of twenty-six to two of the dele-
gates to the meeting.25 Rejection of the proposed amendment implies,
on its face, that the drafters of this provision of the Charter did not
intend to proscribe the use of economic diplomacy within the coverage
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The actual situation, however, is not so
clear. In the first place, one of the arguments made in opposition to
the amendment was that the text of Article 2(4) was broad enough to
prohibit many economic measures without the proposed change. The
delegates supporting this position claimed that the existence of the lan-
guage "or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations" within the final text of Article 2(4) implied that the coverage
of the article was beyond the traditional meaning of armed force.
26
Thus, the confusion that presently surrounds the meaning of the
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 32,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
24. Amendments of the Brazilian Delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Doc. 2,
G/7(e)(4), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 251, 253-54 (1945) (emphasis added).
25. Summary of the Eleventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
26. Id. at 334.
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phrase "use of force" has existed from the very drafting sessions of the
Charter and is the product of a drafting mechanism that intentionally
sought to include a certain amount of ambiguity and flexibility in the
terminology of the Charter.
Another argument that some commentators have made is that,
while it may be true that the original intention of the drafters of this
language may not have been to include the concept of "economic coer-
cion" within the ambit of Article 2, the Charter has subsequently de-
veloped in such a way that this concept's inclusion is necessary to the
proper functioning of the international system and has been accepted
by the Member States through their subsequent practice.27 The basic
idea put forward by these writers is that the meaning of the various
provisions of the Charter may be changed through the practice of the
Member States of the United Nations in a way that may be at variance
with the understandings of the initial drafters of the instrument. As
one commentator explained it:
[T]he United Nations Charter is no historical monument, but a living
instrument which continues to expand due to the dynamic and progres-
sive nature of our international society whose prime objectives is still the
maintenance of peace and security.
28
This position is supported by some of the most basic principles of
treaty interpretation 29 and is well known in municipal constitutional
interpretation. 30 The full implications of an evolutionary approach to
the interpretation of the Charter are beyond the scope of this Note.
However, the Note will explore this concept through the analysis of
some of the many resolutions passed by the U.N. General Assembly in
this area. While a treaty (in this case the Charter) may be subject to
change through the customary use of its members,3 ' the kind of
"evolution" that the meaning of the document's terms undergoes
through such mechanisms must have some limits. Though the princi-
ple that treaties may evolve to some extent over time seems unobjec-
tionable in itself, some point exists where the mutation of the meaning
of the instrument has created something which is so different from the
original understanding and text that it is difficult to argue that it is the
same document to which all of the signatories agreed.
27. Brosche, supra note 2, at 23.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, arts. 31(3)(a)-31(3)(b); Rudolf Bernhardt, Interpreta-
tion in International Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 318, 322 (Ru-
dolf Bernhard ed., 1984).
30. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 8-13
(1991).
31. See Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 31(3).
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As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the applicability of Article
2(4) of the Charter is quite unclear and subject to widely divergent
interpretations. Some commentators have concluded that Article 2(4)
prohibits the use of economic diplomacy in a rather broad fashion,
32
others have concluded that it only prohibits the most extreme forms of
politically motivated state action, 33 while still others have concluded
that Article 2(4) itself places no restrictions on the use of such
actions.
34
Another interpretive problem exists with regard to Article 2(4)'s
coverage of the concept of economic coercion as a use of force, relating
to its interaction with Article 51 of the Charter. 35 As has been stated,
Article 2(4) bans the use of force, while Article 51 provides the ag-
grieved party the right to exercise self-defense only in the face of an
"armed attack." Assuming that Article 2(4) of the Charter proscribes
the use of certain forms of economic coercion, then the question must
be answered whether such action would provide the "attacked" State
with the right of self-defense under Article 51. While Kelsen and
some other commentators suggest that Article 51 of the Charter does
not limit the exercise of self-defense to cases where the State is under
an armed attack against its borders,36 the better position, both in terms
of the weight of opinion among commentators and the actual language
and purpose of the Charter, is that an economic "attack" is not suffi-
cient to justify a State in taking action in self-defense under Article 51
of the Charter. 37
32. See Brosche, supra note 2, at 19, 34; Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5, at 415-19. While
Neff does not specify to what extent Article 2(4) places restrictions on this sort of activity, he
finds that it continues to have some relevance in the general regulation of the use of economic
diplomacy. Neff, supra note 2, at 140.
33. Farer, for instance, believes that Article 2(4) may come into play only when "the objec-
tive of the coercion is to liquidate an existing state or to reduce that state to the position of a
satellite." Farer, supra note 5, at 413.
34. A whole host of commentators on the subject have found that Article 2(4) is not truly
applicable to the regulation of the use of economic state action. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note
5, at 340; Bowett, supra note 5, at 245 (citing the debates of the U.N. Special Committee on
Friendly Relations Between States); Kausch, supra note 5, at 31. "[C]onventional wisdom" is
that the applicability of Article 2(4) to economic diplomacy is "doubtful." Lillich, supra note 6,
at 236.
35. Article 51 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security....
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
36. HANS KELSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 59-66 (1957); JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS 100 (1977).
37. See LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 70 (1946) for a discussion of Article 51's legislative history
that supports this view.
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This analysis indicates that a gap would exist between the use of
force banned under Article 2(4) of the Charter and the position where
States might exercise the use of force in their own self-defense, if the
Charter prohibits certain types of economic diplomacy. Such a gap
would severely detract from the consistency of the international sys-
tem under the U.N. Charter and strongly implies that the meaning of
the term "force" in Article 2(4) refers only to the sort of activity that
would constitute an armed attack.
38
One of the approaches to the argument that Article 2(4) prohibits
the use of economic diplomacy has been strongly influenced by the
"policy science" school of thought finding its roots in the work of
Myres McDougal, among others.39 The idea of the "policy science"
writers is that the policy underlying the words of Article 2(4) repre-
sents a certain type of goal and that anything that violates this broad
goal should be deemed illegal under the instrument 0 To these writ-
ers, Article 2(4) encompasses a principle far broader than the prohibi-
tion of the use of armed force in order to interfere in the sovereign
rights of another State. To them, the Charter represents an attempt to
prohibit the use of coercion "of such an intensity, efficacy, and magni-
tude as to threaten the security of another State significantly. '41 Es-
sentially, they see Article 2(4) as providing a broad and wide-ranging
attempt to restrict the use of State action that limits, in some signifi-
cant and inappropriate way, the decisions that other States make. The
important question is not whether the original drafters of the Charter
intended to prohibit economic diplomacy within their condemnation
of the use of "force" in Article 2(4), but whether the use of such means
frustrates the purposes and goals of the international system as articu-
lated throughout the Charter.42
To support the policy-oriented reading of the instrument, these
writers have argued that the General Assembly has reflected the goals
of the Charter in numerous resolutions 43 and that the Charter itself
38. DEREK W. BoWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958).
39. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 12, at 170-80 for a good discussion of the "New Haven
School" of international law.
40. Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5, at 412-15.
41. Id. at 416.
42. See MYRES MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINE FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 157-216 (1961) (dealing with the definition of "aggression" in this light).
43. Among the various resolutions that have been cited are: The Declaration on the Inadmis-
sibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6220
(1965) [hereinafter Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention]; Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations];
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makes its goal values clear through its wording prohibiting the use of
"force" not of "armed force." The latter of these two points rests
upon the notion that the Charter in certain areas (notably Articles 41
and 46, as well as the preamble to Section VII)'specifically refers to
"armed force" while Article 2(4) mentions "force" without the limit-
ing term "armed." To them, this disparity in the language within cer-
tain articles of the Charter suggests that the term "force should receive
a broader reading in respect to the application of Article 2 than in the
rest of the Charter." 44 The position is further strengthened in their
eyes by the clear goal of Articles 1 and 2 of eliminating the threat of
the use of armed force between States. Therefore, the question is not
whether a particular State has used force as the term might have been
understood by the drafters of the Charter, but whether its acts are
comparable in the degree of danger to international peace and secur-
ity, as well as coercive impact on the international community, as is
the use of armed force.
45
As mentioned earlier, a substantial amount of effort has been ex-
pended on the question of whether the use of certain types of economic
diplomacy amounts to "aggression" on the part of the acting State.46
As has also been stated, much of this analysis proceeds within the gen-
eral context of a discussion of Article 2(4) to the issue at hand. Many
of the publicists on this subject tend to collapse the concept of aggres-
sion under Article 39 and the use of force under Article 2(4) of the
Charter so that they are treated as interchangeable concepts. How-
ever, the only purely textual relevance to this issue, insofar as the
Charter itself is concerned, relates to Article 39. Article 39 states in
relevant part:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.4
7
As this language illustrates, the only real relevance to consideration of
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974) [hereinafter Resolution on Sovereignty
over Resources]; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Charter of Economic
Rights].
44. Brosche, supra note 2, at 20.
45. Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5, at 416.
46. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Aggression, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 4-5 (Rudolf Bernhard ed., 1988); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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whether something constitutes "aggression" is that the Security Coun-
cil has an obligation to act, under Article 41 and 42, to end such ac-
tion. Nonetheless, in understanding the position of economic
diplomacy in international law, it is useful to examine the attempts the
United Nations has made to define "aggression."
48
The efforts by various units of the United Nations to define "ag-
gression" have proven to be some of the main vehicles for the condem-
nation of the use of economic diplomacy as violative of international
law. Many of the Third and Second World States have attempted to
define "aggression" in such a way that the exercise of certain forms of
economic diplomacy would constitute aggression for the purposes of
the use of that term within the Charter.
The Soviet Union proposed the following definition for aggression
to one of the special committees on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion (the Committee):
3. [A] State shall be declared to have committed an act of economic
aggression which first commits one of the following acts:
(a) Takes against another State measures of economic pressure
threatening the bases of its economic life, in violation of its sover-
eignty and economic independence;
(b) Takes against another State measures preventing it from exploit-
ing or nationalizing its own natural riches;
(c) Subjects another State to an economic blockade.
49
The discussion that took place within the Committee itself indicates
that the delegates supporting the proposal intended to apply a very
broad and strict definition of the concept of aggression. Therefore, the
proposed definition of "aggression" clearly includes within the ambit
of "economic coercion" much of what this Note has described as eco-
nomic diplomacy. Several of the delegates to the Committee stated
that some actions they characterized as economic aggression were fun-
damentally similar to "armed aggression." According to the delegate
from Iran, "any act which served the same ultimate purpose as the
armed attack or involved the use of coercion to endanger the indepen-
dence of a State should be considered as aggression." 50 The signifi-
cance of this definition can be seen in light of the view taken by the
Bolivian delegate who argued that while Article 39 of the Charter did
not itself provide a basis for the eradication of economic aggression,
48. See sources cited supra note 46.
49. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION, UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: DRAFT RESOLUTION, U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.2, at 3 (1953).
50. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.I 1 (1953) [hereinafter REPORT DEFINING AGGRESSION]. Moreover, the
delegates from the States of the Dominican Republic, Syria, and Bolivia also clearly held similar
views on what constituted "economic aggression" for the purposes of the Charter.
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such State action did violate three basic principles derived from differ-
ent provisions of the Charter. According to Mr. Araoz, the exercise of
such measures constituted a violation of the principles of sovereign
equality, political independence, and protection against intervention in
Member States' domestic affairs.5 Thus, while the literal language of
the Charter does not contain a substantive prohibition of "aggres-
sion," economic diplomacy can be seen as proscribed by the basic
principles of the organization. 52
Many of the industrialized First World States' delegates to the
Committee strongly opposed such arguments, asserting that the pro-
posed construction offered by certain delegates amounted to a de facto
amendment of the Charter. The United States, in particular, noted
that there was a chance that the expansion of the term "aggression" to
include economic acts could result in dangerous implications for the
right of self-defense under Article 51. Moreover, it asserted that while
it is true that economic independence is an important interest of the
State, this form of independence could not be considered to be on the
same level as political independence. Political independence is only
implicated by the use of armed force.
Serious flaws existed in both the "restrictive" approach to the use
of economic diplomacy, reflected in the positions of many of the dele-
gates of Second and Third World countries, and the more expansive
position put forth by the industrialized States. In the first place, the
restrictive approach defined the concept of "economic aggression"
through reference to a State's sovereignty and "economic indepen-
dence."' 53 This position in fact begged the question that was before the
Committee. The question really was what constituted the scope of a
State's economic sovereignty in which it could operate without the in-
terference of other States. Thus, if a State has no sovereign right to
conduct international trade with other States, the exercise of economic
diplomacy depriving it of such trade cannot be a violation of the target
State's rights. Consequently, even assuming that the concept of "eco-
nomic aggression" was included within the Charter's meaning of the
term aggression, the definition of the term that was offered by these
"restrictive" States failed to illustrate what economic actions properly
fell within its ambit in that it was premised on a tautological position.
On the other hand, the position of the industrialized States was
also problematic in many respects. The distinction that was proffered
5 1. Id. at 24.
52. E.g., Art. 1.
53. See REPORT DEFINING AGGRESSION, supra note 50.
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between economic and political independence seems quite artificial in
that it does not delineate where one starts and the other stops. More-
over, the conclusion that Article 51 would be implicated amounted to
little more than a straw man argument in that Article 51 itself specifi-
cally states that it only applies in the case of an "armed attack.
'5 4
This language in the instrument places application of Article 51
outside the realm of mere economic aggression.
As mentioned earlier, the importance of the definition of the con-
cept of "economic aggression" is not immediately clear on the face of
the provisions of the Charter itself. However, it may have been quite
important indeed given much of the debate that has taken place within
the United Nations. As an example, a full committee of the Interna-
tional Law Commission recommended that the use of "economic ag-
gression" be made an international criminal violation in the Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 55 More-
over, in the event that the Security Council was to find that certain
economic activity should be classified as aggression, it could possibly
order a number of very serious sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 of
the U.N. Charter. The Security Council has very broad and powerful
authority and may order economic sanctions, including the total inter-
national embargo of trade with the State by all members of the United
Nations, and even may order the use of military force in order to end
the aggression.
56
In the end, the question of whether economic aggression could be
considered to be aggression under the Charter was settled in the favor
of those who wished to apply a restrictive definition to the term. The
final text of the resolution which was passed by unanimous consent of
the General Assembly indicates that "[a]ggression is the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
54. U.N. CHARTER Art. 51 (reproduced supra note 35).
55. The Draft states,
The intervention by the authorities of a State in the internal or external affairs of another
State, by means of coercive measures of an economic or political character, in order to force
its will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind [shall be a violation of international law].
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, at 9, 10, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
56. See Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, which provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER Art. 42.
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with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition." '57
This definition, on its face, implies that the debate on whether the use
of economic diplomacy amounts to aggression is over. However, some
commentators have noted that the possibility still exists that such
forms of unarmed conduct may constitute aggression since nothing in
the resolution forecloses a broader reading of the language of the
Charter.
58
Some commentators have cited Article 2(3) of the Charter in their
discussion of the legality of the exercise of economic coercion. Article
2(3) deals with pacific settlement of disputes between members of the
United Nations. Some of these writers find that Article 2(3) places an
affirmative obligation on States not to exercise economic diplomacy
while they are engaged in a dispute with another State:
[I]t is quite clear that embargoes, boycotts, blockades, reprisals, or other
kinds of economic ... pressure do not constitute procedures of pacific
settlement. They are not peaceful means and not appropriate for the
solution of disputes. The use or imposition of such measures would con-
stitute a violation of the obligation to settle international disputes by
peaceful means [under Article 2(3) of the Charter].59
This position is subject to several criticisms. First, the argument as-
sumes that the use of economic diplomacy is neither "peaceful" nor
useful in bringing about the settlement of disputes between States. 6°
As discussed earlier, conceivably, certain economic actions might be
taken that would endanger international peace. However, it is a signif-
icant stretch to argue that all forms of economic action related to the
attainment of political ends are likely to cause a breach of the interna-
tional peace. Many of these actions themselves6I do not require the use
of armed force for their execution and therefore would not clearly con-
stitute a nonpeaceful means of dispute settlement. Secondly, the posi-
tion adopted here is strikingly utopian. Professor Harmut Brosche
seems to suggest that virtually no form of "coercive" conduct of one
party to a dispute against another is legitimate under the scheme of the
Charter. The very fact that a dispute has arisen between the parties
implies that some form of coercive activity has been taken. For in-
57. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (emphasis added).
58. See Brosche, supra note 2, at 30.
59. Id. at 32. Accord Blum, supra note 5, at 15:
[Most boycotts] are ... unquestionably incompatible with the duty of states, under article
2(3) of the Charter, to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and are likely to
exacerbate international tensions and to endanger international peace and security the main-
tenance of which is the central objective of contemporary international society.
60. BALDWIN, supra note 5, at 345-47.
61. E.g., the boycott, embargo, or other reprisals as opposed to a blockade.
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stance, it seems that few legitimate "disputes" between States could
occur if one party to the dispute did not exercise some form of political
persuasion or imply that certain negative consequences would arise in
their relations with one another if the other State continued in its ob-
jectionable conduct.
C. General Assembly Resolutions
Commentators also argue that the principle of nonintervention
supports the use of economic diplomacy's illegality. The principle of
nonintervention in the sovereign affairs of States is specifically in-
cluded in Article 2(7) of the Charter.62 Moreover, this principle has
been extensively interpreted and amplified by the subsequent work of
the General Assembly in this area of the law. 63 Many commentators
have seized upon this obligation as the strongest argument that the use
of economic diplomacy has been generally outlawed.
The U.N. General Assembly possesses no general lawmaking
power of its own accord, unlike the Security Council. 64 This fact has
prompted many people to argue that its resolutions are of no weight at
all in an argument concerning international law. The position has
been widely and properly rejected by the majority of scholars in the
field.6 5 Of course, it is true that the resolutions are not legally signifi-
cant in and of themselves; they are, however, evidence of the forma-
tion of customary norms of international law and provide very strong
interpretive guidance in the meaning of U.N. Charter provisions in
much the same way (although not as authoritatively) as do decisions
of the International Court of Justice. 66 Thus, we may look to the ac-
tions of the General Assembly in order to guide us in understanding
certain provisions of the Charter and the formation of customary in-
ternational law, where there has been substantial agreement among
the major blocs of members of the General Assembly.67
The General Assembly has repeatedly taken action in the form of
resolutions. Among the international instruments that are most com-
62. Paragraph 7 provides,
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdition of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
63. For examples of the numerous resolutions in this field, see those cited supra note 43.
64. See Oscar Schachter, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legitimation in the
United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 3 (1981).
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 12-14.
67. See JAMES FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 42 (1982).
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monly cited relating to the legality of economic diplomacy are the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Af-
fairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sover-
eignty (the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention), 68 the
Essentials of Peace Resolution,69 the Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations),70 and the Resolu-
tion on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (the Resolu-
tion on Sovereignty over Resources).71 The latter two of these
resolutions are the most often cited and the most important actions by
the General Assembly in this area of the law.
The Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations provides that
"[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from
it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure
from it advantages of any kind."'72 The language of this instrument
seems to place a powerful regulation on the use of economic diplo-
macy which suborns the sovereignty of any other State, or which co-
erces it to grant any kind of concession, despite the confusing use of
the conjunctive "and" instead of the disjunctive "or" in its language.
However, the strength of the regulation is one that is defined by the
scope of the meaning of the term "sovereignty." This type of tautol-
ogy has been explored earlier in this Note. 73 The problem is that the
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations never defines the word
"sovereignty;" yet the substance of the legal norm is one that is pre-
mised on conflicting claims of sovereignty between the acting and the
target state. The entire question in this area of the law relates to how
far State sovereignty extends and how much interference in State ac-
tion must be tolerated under international law. If a State has no sover-
eign right of access to the international markets of other States, then
another State's embargo or boycott of it does not interfere with the
affected State's sovereignty. Moreover, the issue of whether the other
State has a sovereign right not to trade with it also raises a similar
problem. If one State has the sovereign right not to trade with other
68. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 43.
69. Resolution on the Essentials of Peace, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. GAOR Res., 4th Sess., at 13,
U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949).
70. Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 43.
71. Resolution on Sovereignty over Resources, supra note 43.
72. Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 43, at 123.
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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States (as it may have according to other resolutions of the General
Assembly), and another State argues that its actions are subordinating
the target State's sovereign rights, then there would be a conflict in
claims to sovereignty. The Declaration Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions provides no guidance as to which right should be seen as superior
to the other.
74
In the Resolution on Sovereignty over Resources, the General As-
sembly emphasized "the duty of all States to refrain in their interna-
tional relations from military, political, economic or any other form of
coercion aimed against the territorial integrity of any State and the
exercise of its national jurisdiction. ' 75 It has been claimed that the
language of the resolution reflects a customary norm against the use of
economic coercion. However, if this interpretation were correct, the
resolution would constitute an extremely narrow customary norm of
international law. By the language of the instrument itself, the obliga-
tion only affects coercive acts that are aimed at the territorial integrity
or national jurisdiction of the State. Thus, the economic measures
prohibited would be only those that threatened the borders of the State
or that impeded the operation of the State's own ability to enact and
execute its internal laws:
Serious problems exist with the position that these instruments re-
flect decisive evidence of the formation of a general rule against the
exercise of economic diplomacy. Both the Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations and the Resolution on Sovereignty over Resources
reflect a less-than-true consensus of U.N. members. The Declaration
Concerning Friendly Relations was adopted by the General Assembly
without a vote and was subject to many concerns by the leading indus-
trial powers concerning the haste in which it was enacted. 76 The Res-
olution on Sovereignty over Resources was adopted by the General
Assembly on a vote of 108 to 1 to 16. The decisive nature of the vote
on its face seems to be substantial evidence of formation of a custom-
ary norm of international law. However, the provision referring to the
use of economic coercion is itself somewhat collateral to the instru-
ment, which primarily focused on the issue of sovereignty over natural
resources in which the use of coercion was only a secondarily related
matter. Moreover, many of the world's most economically important
States opposed the resolution either in the form of the opposing vote
74. See Ian Brownie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects),
162 R.C.A.D.I. 245, 305-07 (1979).
75. Resolution on Soverignty over Resources, supra note 43, at 61.
76. BALDWIN, supra note 5, at 351.
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(cast by Great Britain) or through the use of an abstention. 77 Further,
the resolutions are so ambiguously phrased and abstractly pitched as
to be of minimal use in determining what the rule of customary inter-
national law is. Therefore, the evidentiary value that these resolutions
serve for proving the formation of a binding rule of customary interna-
tional law is somewhat suspect.
This discussion indicates that considerable disagreement exists
about the applicability of the U.N. Charter and its underlying princi-
ples to the type of State action addressed in this Note. However, some
conclusions can be drawn from the language of the Charter, its
travaux prdparatoires, subsequent practice, and General Assembly
Resolutions. While there has been considerable debate about the ap-
plicability of Article 2(4) of the Charter, the emerging consensus is
that it does not contain a prohibition of the use of economic diplo-
macy. 78 This position is consistent with the language of the Charter.
While it is possible to read the term "force" as meaning something
more than the use of physical power, it seems strained to suggest that
the term can refer to the sort of pressure that is exerted by the use of
economic action as a matter of common usage. Moreover, the Charter
must be read within the context in which it was drafted and each pro-
vision must be viewed in the light of its role in the document as a
whole. The primary concern of the drafters of the Charter was the
prohibition of the use of military action and threats among the mem-
bers of the international community and not the use of economic
sanctions.
79
Article 2(4) should also be read in the light of the rest of the instru-
ment. If the use of economic diplomacy were read to constitute force,
there would be a serious conflict between Article 2(4), Article 51, and
the other areas of the Charter which make reference to "aggression"
or "armed force." The most logical conclusion to draw from this dis-
cussion is that Article 2(4) was meant to proscribe the use of some sort
of physical force, but is not necessarily limited to armed force.
The position of Article 2(3) of the Charter in this debate is per-
haps more important. Certain forms of economic activity might be-
come so onerous as to be likely to frustrate the pacific settlement of
disputes.80 An action that would deprive the citizens of a State from
77. Among the States that abstained from the vote were the United States, Japan, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and France. U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Vol. III, 2203d plen. mtg., at 13,
U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2203 (1973-74).
78. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 5, at 340 (particularly sources cited in n.17); Bowett,
supra note 5, at 245; Kausch, supra note 5, at 31; Lillich, supra note 6, at 234.
79. Farer, supra note 5, at 410.
80. See Blum, supra note 5, at 13; Brosche, supra note 2, at 30-32.
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pursuing economic activity that is necessary for survival or from main-
taining some hope for economic advancement would create a real pos-
sibility that the affected State would lash out forcefully against its
opponents. Thus, the responsibility of States to act in such a way as to
facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes would place some substan-
tive limits on the kinds of economic action that it might take. Addi-
tionally, inherent in the concept of peaceful settlement of disputes is
the notion that each interested State should have some sort of oppor-
tunity to be heard in negotiations or arbitration before adverse action
is taken as a result of the dispute. Therefore, before a State may im-
pose some sort of economic sanction against a State with whom it is
engaged in a dispute, it must provide the opposing State with a reason-
able opportunity to present its side of the issue and to negotiate for the
amicable settlement of the grievance."'
Finally, we come to the issue of whether there is a prohibitory rule
of law relating to economic action premised upon the principle of non-
intervention as mentioned in Article 2(7) of the Charter and signifi-
cantly amplified by several resolutions of the General Assembly.
While it is arguable that a basis for some sort of prohibition of the use
of economic measures exists under these principles, the position has
several flaws. The first relates to the tautological nature of the use of
many concepts exemplified by the preceding discussion of sovereignty.
Further, these concepts are especially abstract and ambiguous even
within the field of international law - which is itself riddled with ab-
straction and ambiguity in many areas. Thus, while it is possible that
certain areas of State activity are such important aspects of sover-
eignty as to be outside of the legitimate range of the use of certain
forms of economic diplomacy (i.e., the nationalization of natural re-
sources and the choice of form of government), this category is lim-
ited, and somewhat ill-defined. This area of the law remains
complicated and unclear and few definite statements may be made
about it.
D. The Standard of Conduct Applied by the Publicists of
International Law
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Charter or one of its
"authoritative" interpretations provides some sort of prohibition of
the use of economic coercion, the question that arises is: what form of
conduct violates of these norms? As might be expected from the in-
decisive nature of the debate concerning control of the use of economic
81. 12 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (1971).
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diplomacy under the Charter, there is extraordinary confusion con-
cerning what form and quantity of conduct would violate one of the
prescribed norms of State behavior.
82
While little scholarship has focused on this question, some com-
mentators have considered what type of conduct should be seen as
violative of the principles of the United Nations and the prohibitions
placed within the Charter itself. Professor Bowett has formulated the
most widely accepted definition of conduct that is violative of the
Charter. His definition focuses on thepurpose of the acting State in its
use of economic diplomacy. Under Bowett's approach the focus of the
inquiry would be whether the acting State intended its actions either to
threaten the territorial integrity of the target State or to impede the
target State's sovereign rights.
While this position has been accepted by many of the most promi-
nent scholars in this field, its utility is somewhat suspect. How does
one determine the intent or purpose of a State?83 Professor Bowett has
suggested that this should be an objective inquiry84 (as it must be since
there is no "mind" of the State to probe). However, the realistic possi-
bility of determining the intent of the modern Leviathan State seems
difficult to imagine. States are incorporeal entities who are incapable
of having a single "state of mind" or even a common purpose among
all the elements of the bureaucracy that forms and executes their poli-
cies. In fairness, Professor Bowett certainly appreciates this dilemma
and seeks to counter these criticisms with his insistence that his is an
objective standard looking to the actions of the State in order to deter-
mine the motives for the conduct carried on in its name.
The test of the purpose of the State is destined for manipulation by
acting States and its application would undoubtedly result in constant
and indecisive allegations and denials of bad motive between the act-
ing and the target States. Moreover, unlike their municipal counter-
parts, international lawyers have very little experience applying intent-
based analysis. International law does not traditionally look to the
motive of State actions but instead erects what are essentially strict
liability offenses where the motive of the parties is either irrelevant or
so obvious on the face of the activity as to be without consequence.8 5
Thus, Bowett's test, while clearly crafted to address the types of harm
82. See Lillich, supra note 6, at 238-40.
83. See Blum, supra note 5, at 13 for an assessment of an intent-based standard in this field of
international law which concludes that such a standard is "artificial."
84. Bowett, supra note 5, at 254-55.
85. Generally, the intent of the party is not a pertinent question in similar areas of the law.
For instance, it is obvious that the aggressive use of force contrary to Article 2 or an armed
attack mentioned in Article 51 of the Charter is intended to act against the sovereignty and
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argued about by the advocates of the illegality of economic coercion,
seems so unworkable as to be of little help.
Unfortunately, Professor Bowett's is the only formulation of a test
of the legality of the exercise of international economic diplomacy that
even approaches precision. The other discussions in this area are fo-
cused on providing the international community with only the most
abstract principles to guide the debate on the legality of State action in
the execution of economic diplomacy. For instance, it has been sug-
gested that the standard of determining the legality of the action taken
by States should look to the purpose of the action, its intensity, and
effects, 86 or that they should be judged in light of the overall interests
of the international community. 87 These positions seem to be inoffen-
sive on their face, but they are framed at such a high level of theoreti-
cal abstraction and ambiguity that they become almost impossible to
apply in a predictable and fair manner.
No clear and widely accepted definition exists of what conduct
constitutes a violation of one of the norms of law that may be inferred
from the language of the Charter itself. The absence of a definition
creates difficulty for international lawyers because it keeps the debate
focused on whether any arguable foundation exists for the illegality of
some sort of economic activity but pays little or no attention to what
sort of activity is specifically implicated by the existence of a norm in
this area. Seemingly all of the advocates of a finding that the Charter
provides limiting norms of conduct will admit that not all forms of
persuasive economic conduct launched by one State against another
would be prohibited,88 but no scholars or policymakers have engaged
in concrete discussion of what sorts of activity would be covered by
such rules. This failure has kept the debate at an artificial level of
abstraction with seemingly little concrete reference to particular ac-
tions of States that would clearly come under one of these norms of
State behavior. 89 Therefore, assuming that some sort of norm exists in
this area, its contours are so vague and difficult to discern that there is
virtually no way that any State could conform its conduct to the
bounds of legality. Some attempt must be made to clarify the types of
territory of the victim State, thus making any endeavor to explore the subjective intent of the
State actors irrelevant.
86. Domingo E. Acevedo, The US. Measures Against Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas
Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 337 (1984).
87. Lillich, supra note 6, at 240.
88. Id.; Bowett, supra note 5, at 249-52.
89. Moreover, the United Nations resolutions are "pitched on such a high level of abstrac-
tion as to be virtually meaningless." Lillich, supra note 6, at 238.
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activity that may be seen as illegal under the Charter or any custom-
ary norm which may be relevant.
II. CUSTOMARY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Practice of States
One of the primary deficiencies of the work that has been done in
the field of the legality of economic diplomacy in international law is
that the writers have concentrated on the work of international agen-
cies in isolation from the actual practice of States.9° Therefore, this
Note will discuss the historical practice of the members of the interna-
tional community in order to determine what customary norms of be-
havior may have arisen in this area of the regulation of State action.
While the resort to economic action against States for political
ends dates at least as far back as the ancient Greeks according to Thu-
cydides,91 it was not until the beginning of this century that the type of
action that has come to be frequently taken began to be pursued in
earnest.92 At the beginning of the twentieth century, one State was
commonly known as the principle practitioner of this type of activity
- China. China instituted trading embargoes and boycotts against a
number of States. Perhaps the most widely known Chinese activities
occurred in the context of the Boxer Rebellion, the U.S. prohibition of
Chinese immigration, and several disputes with Japan, including the
Japanese occupation of the territory of Manchuria. 93 These actions of
the Chinese government caused such a high level of concern that they
were one of the main focuses of the Lytton Commission,94 which was
sent to the area by the League of Nations in order to investigate the
nature of the disputes between Japan and China, and were the source
of considerable criticism from the western States at the time of the
Boxer Rebellion. In its conclusions, the Lytton Commission avoided
making broad statements concerning the legality of State-sponsored
economic boycotts and principally found that the boycott was en-
90. By actual practice I mean to distinguish the sort of practice that takes place in the form
of government statements and actions on resolutions from those where it actually takes some sort
of concrete action through the use of its regulatory functions.
91. GARY G. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 4 (1983).
92. Neff, supra note 2, at 120.
93. For a list of the boycotts China employed in this time period, see Christopher C. Joyner,
The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International Law: Policy, Place, and Prac-
tice, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 210-12 (1984); Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 126-27.
94. See Appeal by Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, League of Na-
tions, Doc. C.663, M.320, ViI, at 112-21 (1932).
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forced through the action of private parties.95 It found, however, the
practice of State-sanctioned boycotts disturbing and expressed the
hope that "in the interest of all States, this problem should be consid-
ered at an early date and regulated by international agreement. '96
While it is true that the Chinese government was the major user of
economic measures in support of foreign policy during the beginning
of the twentieth century, numerous other States utilized economic di-
plomacy during this early period. India enacted an economic boycott
as a means of attaining its nationalistic goals against the British as
early as 1896 and continued to do so periodically until the last and
largest of the boycotts of British milled goods took place in the
1930s.97 In 1908 the Ottoman Empire launched a boycott of goods
from Austria-Hungary in response to that State's annexation of the
territories of Bosnia and Herzogovina. 98 Finally, Egypt boycotted a
number of British goods in 1924 as a part of its national independence
movement. 99
Itis apparent that the use of economic measures by individual
States was a somewhat common occurrence at the beginning of this
century. After the founding of the League of Nations, the practice of
exercising economic measures in order to further foreign policy goals
became even more common, with the principle utilizers of such means
changing from the developing States to the larger powers of the pe-
riod. Britain and the United States used economic diplomacy exten-
sively in the interwar period with Britain imposing economic sanctions
of one form or another against Yugoslavia for its aggressive activity
against Albania, against the U.S.S.R. for the release of certain British
citizens, and against Mexico in order to settle certain expropriation
claims. 100
Though States actively utilized economic diplomacy during the in-
terwar period, the period following World War II was even more im-
portant for the use of these methods. A broader range of States began
to use such actions. For example, the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance and Mutual Cooperation (COMECON), which consisted
of most of the Eastern bloc countries, imposed a boycott on trade with
95. Id.
96. Id. at 120.
97. See BIPAN CHANDRA, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN INDIA
122 (1966); R.J. MOORE, THE CRISIS OF INDIAN UNITY 1917-1940, at 171 (1974); Joyner, supra
note 93, at 212.
98. See WADE D. DAVID, EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION
1906-1909, at 101 (1940); Joyner, supra note 93, at 213.
99. Lauterpacht, supra note 8, at 126.
100. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 91, at 14 (1983).
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Yugoslavia in 1948 as a result of the political rift that had arisen be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Tito regime.' 0 ' The Eastern bloc
countries soon found themselves to be at the other end of a trade em-
bargo for certain forms of strategic goods as a result of the action of
the Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM) in 1948.102
Middle Eastern countries were particularly active in adopting cer-
tain forms of economic action in the period immediately after World
War II. On May 2, 1951, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh an-
nounced the nationalization of the oil industry within Iran including
the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.103 As a result, the
British and the U.S. governments launched a worldwide coordinated
boycott of Iranian oil which played a significant role in the Prime
Minister's downfall.'
°4
However, by far the most important use of economic diplomacy
related to the Middle East was the Arab League's boycott of Israel
after the 1948 War.'0 5 This boycott presently is administered in a co-
ordinated fashion by the Central Boycott Office in Damascus which
ensures that the boycott is effective in virtually all of the Arab States
(with the obvious exception of Egypt, as it is no longer in a state of
belligerency with Israel). Moreover, this boycott is broader than
many of the economic measures cited previously in that it not only
seeks to proscribe trade between Arab League members and Israel, but
also attempts to implement a form of "secondary" and even "tertiary"
boycott.106 Under the secondary boycott, firms that continue to trade
with Israel are placed on a "blacklist" of firms that are not permitted
to trade in Arab League States. The tertiary boycott is similar but
goes further in that it results in the refusal to deal with firms that
would not come under the terms of the primary or secondary boycott
but which do business with firms that do appear on the primary or
secondary blacklist. This is, without a doubt, the most sophisticated
form of economic boycott that is currently in existence, although some
suggestions have been made that it is beginning to break down in the
101. Id., at 15; Joyner, supra note 93, at 214.
102. For a discussion of the role of COCOM in international trade, see Cecil Hunt, Multilat-
eral Cooperation in Export Control - The Role of COCOM, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285 (1983).
103. NASROLLAH S. FATEMI, OIL DIPLOMACY 342-43 (1954).
104. M. REZA GHODS, IRAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 187-89 (1989).
105. There are a number of interesting works dealing with the origins of the Arab Boycott.
See, e.g., DAN S. CHILL, THE ARAB BOYCOTr OF ISRAEL (1976); WALTER H. NELSON & TER-
ENCE C.F. PRIrIE, THE ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (1977); AARON J. SARNA, Boy-
COTT AND BLACKLIST (1986).
106. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 313-21 (2d ed.
1983).
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aftermath of the Persian Gulf war and the initiatives of the United
States to bring the Arabs and Israelis to the peace table.' 0 7
Not even this action - the general Arab Boycott - is the most
famous of the uses of economic measures for political ends in the Mid-
dle East. The action that has been without a doubt the most com-
monly discussed within this area of international law was the 1973
Arab Oil Embargo of certain States that supported Israel in the 1973
War. 0 8 Scholars that have investigated the legality of this conduct of
the Arab States under international law have disagreed and no partic-
ularly definitive conclusion on the subject exists. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the action provoked extremely strong criticism from
the western oil-consuming States at the time of the embargo.' °9 In
particular, some U.S. officials suggested that it might become neces-
sary that they use military force to gain access to the Arab oil if the
position continued to worsen." 0 This Western reaction to the Arab
Oil Embargo undoubtedly constituted the strongest objection from the
members of the industrialized First World States to the use of eco-
nomic diplomacy and turned the usual situation, where the First
World State took the action of economic diplomacy while the affected
Third or Second World States raised the objection that the action was
illegal under international law, on its head.
Interestingly, it was the United States that raised the loudest objec-
tions to the imposition of the Arab Oil Embargo."' Its position is
somewhat ironic given that the United States has probably been the
most extensive user of the methods of economic diplomacy." 2 The
United States has placed numerous trade controls concerning the
States with which its nationals may trade and has even sought to apply
them to its nationals that are operating abroad.' '3 The U.S. Executive
Branch has taken many actions severely restricting trade with foreign
nationals of certain States and restricting the movement of capital be-
107. Kim Murphy, Cracks in a 45-Year Boycott, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1991, at Al, A15.
108. See Bilder, supra note 5; Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Destina-
tion Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).
109. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Kissinger Warns Arab on Oil Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1974, at 1, 8.
110. Id.
111. See. e.g., id.
112. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ... Sauce for the Gander": The Arab Boycott and United
States Political Trade Controls, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 25 (1977). For an interesting discussion of the
scope of similar United States action in this field, see Michael P. Malloy, Embargo Programs of
the United States Treasury Department, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (1981).
113. See Howard N. Fenton III, United States Antiboycott Laws. An Assessment of Their
Impact Ten Years After Adoption, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 211 (1987) for an




longing to those States under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 1 4 the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act,1 5 as well as the Ex-
port Administration Act. 11 6 Among the countries against whom the
United States has recently maintained severe economic sanctions are
Iran, 1 7 Cuba,118 Libya,1 19 the Soviet Union, 20 South Africa, 12 1 and
most recently Iraq.' 22 Moreover, one of the cornerstones of the U.S.
government's actions against the former Sandinista government in
Nicaragua was a virtual trade embargo with that country that was
eventually raised in numerous international fora.'
23
Another example of a hotly debated use of collective economic di-
plomacy came in the context of the Falkland Islands conflict between
the United Kingdom and Argentina.1 24 After the Argentinian armed
forces entered into the Falklands, claiming them as a part of Argen-
tinian territory, many of the industrialized States enacted economic
sanctions against Argentina. The sanctions were strongly criticized by
numerous developing countries (especially those in Latin America)
and were eventually condemned by the Organization of American
States. 125
Finally, the most recent example of economic sanctions, of both
those authorized by the Security Council and those undertaken inde-
pendently, is the strong economic actions imposed against Iraq in re-
114. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1989).
115. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1989).
116. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1989).
117. The U.S. government retains strict control over Iranian assets in the United States, 31
C.F.R. § 535 (1990), as well as controls over transactions with the country, 31 C.F.R. § 560
(1990). In the past the United States has imposed a complete trade embargo and boycott against
Iran pursuant to an Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12,282, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1981), reprinted as
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1989).
118. Cuban Asset Controls Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1990). See Anna P. Schreiber,
Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Economic Measures Against Cuba
and the Dominican Republic, 25 WORLD POL. 387 (1973).
119. The relevant regulations concerning Libya are set forth at 31 C.F.R. § 550 (1990).
120. The so-called "Jackson -Vanick" Amendment has kept communist countries from at-
taining MFN status. The Jackson-Vanick Amendment in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, §§ 401-11 (1975), is found in various places throughout Title 19 of the United States
Code, particularly 19 U.S.C. § 2431 (1989).
121. The transaction controls against South Africa appear at 31 C.F.R. § 545 (1990).
122. The United States currently has placed a complete trade stoppage on Iraq pursuant to
Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990). It has also seized control
over all Iraqi assets in the United States. 55 Fed. Reg. H9,857 (1990).
123. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27); United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua - Report by the Panel,
GATT Doc. L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) (Restricted).
124. See Acevedo, supra note 86.
125. Id. at 338-39.
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taliation for its attempted seizure of Kuwait. 126 While it is true that
many of these sanctions have been undertaken under the authority of
the United Nations pursuant to Security Council Resolution, some of
them go beyond the strict requirements of those resolutions and, thus,
may be seen as having been taken independently of the United
Nations. 2
7
B. International Treaties as Practice
The action many States have taken in entering into treaties has
been cited as additional evidence that a customary norm against cer-
tain forms of economic diplomacy has arisen. Perhaps most important
among these treaties is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 28 The GATT is a part of the general Bretton Woods system
of international economic law arising out of the end of World War II.
Article XI of the GATT obliges the Contracting Parties not to place
any sort of quantitative restriction on the amount of goods coming
from or going to one another. Some authorities have cited article XI
as one of the primary examples of the movement toward a customary
norm of international law against the exercise of economic diplo-
macy. 129 However, within the GATT itself is a provision which seems
to authorize the actions that are typically undertaken by States in the
area covered in this Note. Article XXI of the GATT provides that the
GATT should not be construed to "prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests ... taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations."'30 The provision has been used
numerous times to justify the imposition of a variety of economic ac-
tions taken for political purposes, and has been explicitly recognized
by GATT panels as being applicable in some of the most hotly debated
uses of economic diplomacy.' 3 ' From this analysis, it is clear that
126. Exec. Order No. 12,724, supra note 122. See also 55 Fed. Reg. H9,857 (1990).
127. As an example, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Iraq almost im-
mediately upon Iraqi actions in Kuwait. The U.S. government continues to refuse to trade with
Iraq in food or medicine or to unfreeze any of Iraq's assets despite the Embargo Committee's
willingness to allow States to lift economic sanctions so that Iraq may gain access to funds to
purchase food and medicine.
128. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
129. Neff, supra note 13, at 72.
130. GATT, supra note 128, art. XXI(b)(iii) (emphasis added). For a good discussion of the
importance and functioning of Article XXI, see Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of
GAT." An Analysis of GATT's Security Exception, 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 558 (1991).
131. See Hahn, supra note 130, for a good synopsis of th most important cases raised under
Article XXI in GATT fora. The EC defended its actions taken against Argentina on the basis of
Article 51 of the UN Charter, and its position regarding the use of Article XXI of the GATT
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while the GATT generally restricts the use of quantitative measures
such as boycott and embargo, it specifically does not seek to control
the use of such measures when they are taken as a result of security
concerns of the acting party. Therefore, it is very difficult to argue
that the GATT itself reflects a trend away from the traditional cus-
tomary international law where there was seemingly no restriction on
the use of economic diplomacy.
A similar argument is frequently made about the importance of the
existence of prohibitory language in FCNs that States enter into in
order to limit the capability of their international trading partners to
place quantitative restrictions or to treat their goods less favorably
than they treat those of any other States. 32 However, these treaties,
virtually without exception, also include some sort of security excep-
tion or vital interest clause that allows the parties to escape the disci-
pline of the treaty when they feel that it is necessary for them to do
SO.133
Some commentators have noted that article 52 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties is relevant to the issue of the legality of
the exercise of economic diplomacy. This article provides that a treaty
is void if its conclusion was based on consent of a party "procured by
the threat or use of force in violation... [of] the Charter of the United
Nations."' 134 On its face, this provision seems neither to add to nor
subtract from the relevance of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter to the
issue of the exercise of the use of economic diplomacy. However, the
drafting history of the provision reflects that its application may be
broader than that of Article 2(4), which, as concluded earlier, is of
marginal relevance to the regulation of the use of economic diplomacy.
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention was perhaps the most contro-
versial in the convention. Preliminary versions of the article contained
explicit language referring to the use of certain types of economic State
was generally accepted by the various Contracting Parties. See Trade Restrictions Affecting Ar-
gentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev. 1 (1982). Moreover, the
U.S. general embargo of Nicaragua was found to be covered by the scope of article XXI of the
GATT, despite the concern of the panel that the actions of the United States seemed to contra-
dict the general spirit of the General Agreement. Id. For an explanation of the procedure used
for the discussion of these matters, see Richard S. Whitt, The Politics ofProcedure: An Examina-
tion of the GA TT Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S.
Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 603 (1987). An earlier GATT panel found
that the U.S. measures affecting Nicaragua's share of the U.S. sugar market did violate article XI
of the GATT largely because the United States refused to assert the defense of article XXI. See
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
Supp. No. 31, at 67 (1983-84) (Report of the panel adopted on March 13, 1984).
132. See Muir, supra note 5, at 200.
133. Id.
134. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 52.
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action that would vitiate the consent of the treaty making party. 135
However, this proposed formulation of the article came under strenu-
ous attack by many industrialized States. The wording that appears in
the instrument today was adopted despite the apparent fact that the
version covering economic measures would have passed had it not
been for the threat of the Western States to break the consensus of the
Convention's adoption in toto.136 Thus, it is possible to conclude that
the use of economic measures might constitute the type of force suffi-
cient to vitiate a State's consent to a treaty despite the fact that such
action would not constitute force under Article 2(4). However, such a
conclusion would militate against the rather plain meaning of the arti-
cle and would endanger the effective capacity of States to interact with
each other if taken to an extreme.
137
The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) is fre-
quently cited for the proposition that the international community is
moving toward a restrictive customary international law regulation of
the use of economic diplomacy. The OAS Charter provides in Article
18, "[n]o State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of
an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will
of another and obtain from it an advantage of any kind."' 38 This is
the clearest prohibitory statement over the use of economic diplomacy
within an authoritative document of an international organization. It
is often considered a clear exception to the rule, even by those who
argue against an interpretation of the U.N. Charter or the customary
international law prohibiting the use of economic diplomacy.
From this discussion it can be seen that no current customary law
prohibition of the use of economic diplomacy exists. 139 As demon-
135. See PAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 177-89 (2d
ed. 1984).
136. See Charles E. Partridge, Jr., Political and Economic Coercion: Within the Ambit of
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?, 5 INT'L LAW. 755, 756-61 (1971).
137. Id. at 767-68.
138. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 18, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951), amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607.
Similarly, Article 17 provides:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic or cultural elements.
Id., art. 17. The reference to the damage to the "economic . . . elements" coupled with the
concept of indirect intervention suggests that the drafters of the Charter may have meant to
implicate the use of economic diplomacy here.
139. For example, a U.S. Federal Court of Appeals noted, "[w]e cannot find any established
principle of international jurisprudence that requires a nation to continue buying commodities
from an unfriendly source." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 866 (2d Cir.
1966).
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strated by the actual practice of States, the use of economic means for
political ends is rampant in the international arena.140 Moreover, the
majority of publicists in the area, as well as the International Court of
Justice, 141 have held that there is no general customary norm covering
the use of economic diplomacy.
Despite the view that international treatymaking of States leads to
the formation of a customary norm, there seems to be little concrete
action in this direction. Clearly the GATT and some of the other in-
struments relating to international economic law reflect a trend to-
ward restricting the sovereignty of States in the international
economic arena. However, these instruments are constructed with ex-
plicit exceptions in the case that the State feels that its actions are
dictated by political or military security. Thus, these instruments'
control over the action of States seems to end precisely where the dis-
cussion of this Note begins: at the use of economic measures related to
political ends. It seems difficult then to premise an argument about a
trend in the practice of States on such agreements.
The position of the OAS Charter, however, is somewhat different
than other international economic treaties. The activity the Charter
proscribes clearly includes the use of economic measures for political
ends, unlike the GATT and FCN treaties. The actual prohibition of
the use of such State action among the OAS countries seems to be a
legitimate form of State practice needed for the formation of a future
customary norm. It may even point to the existence of a much more
substantial possibility of the formation of a regional customary norm
pertaining to economic diplomacy. The fact that the Member States
of the OAS chose to ban the use of certain forms of economic diplo-
macy among themselves does not indicate that they had a legal obliga-
tion under customary international law to do so. Nor is there any
particular indication that the treaty crystallized preexisting practice of
the States of the Americas. Thus, while the action of the OAS may be
seen as a step in the direction of the formation of a customary norm of
international law, the international community is quite far indeed
from the point where such a norm will be accepted by many of the
most powerful States as a binding customary norm of conduct.
140. As an example, Hufbauer and Schott found and categorized more than 80 specific in-
stances of such conduct between the end of World War I and 1983 taken by an extremely wide
range of States both in terms of economic capacity and ideology in a list that was by no means
exhaustive. HUFBAUER & SCHoTr, supra note 91, at 14-22.
141. As the Court stated in its decision on U.S. activity in Nicaragua, "[a] State is not bound
to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty
commitment or other specific obligation." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986 I.C.J. 14, 138 (June 27).
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III. STATE ECONOMIC ACTION WITHIN THE GENERAL SCHEME
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.
Much debate has taken place within this area of the law, question-
ing the legality of the exercise of economic coercion in light of the
general scheme and goals of the Charter. Yet a great deal of the argu-
ment in this field of law seems highly esoteric and divorced from the
rough realities of the international community. A considerable
number of the arguments have failed to take note of Professor Lillich's
wise admonition that we "must be careful not to confuse lex ferenda
with lex lata" in this area of the law. 142 Many international legal
scholars argue for the application of legal norms that will lower the
level of tension in the international arena regardless of the interna-
tional community's acceptance of such norms. Therefore, scholars
often recommend the adoption of utopian norms of conduct to which
few States would consent if they were forced to comply with the norms
in their own international affairs.
Certain limitations do exist on the use of economic force that have
already been accepted by the world community. First, certain obliga-
tions arise under Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter to pursue the pacific
settlement of disputes which include both substantive and procedural
limitations on the exercise of economic measures of State action.
Moreover, the use of such activity is limited in accordance with the
principle of nonintervention derived from the totality of the Charter
and the subsequent actions of the General Assembly. Further, the use
of economic diplomacy of such an extreme magnitude as to threaten
the existence of the State or the integrity of its borders might be pro-
scribed under Article 2(4) as well.
143
It is difficult to discern what activities would violate these princi-
ples. As mentioned earlier, Professor Bowett has suggested a test that
looks to the purpose of the acting State. Yet this test is so difficult to
apply, given the fact that no State has a singular state of mind, that its
utility is questionable. Part of the problem with this test is that it
seems to be crafted under the assumption that the primary source of
the legal regulation of this conduct is the principle of nonintervention
and the prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. However, the primary and clearest prohibition of the use of
economic diplomacy is entailed in the responsibility to adhere to poli-
cies that facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes as set forth in Arti-
cle 2(3).
142. Lillich, supra note 6, at 234.
143. See Farer, supra note 5, at 411.
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Therefore, this type of illegality is not so much premised on the
intention or purpose of the acting State but instead on the nature of
the threat to peace that the action entails. The most important mea-
sure of the likelihood of a breach of the peace resulting from such
activity would seem to be the quantity of economic hardship that is
suffered by the target State as a result of the economic sanction di-
rected against it. If the residents and nationals of a particular State
are only inconvenienced as a result of the acting State's use of eco-
nomic diplomacy, or forced to pay a higher, yet affordable, price for a
particular good or service there does not seem to be a very high likeli-
hood that it will forcefully retaliate. For example, an embargo on an
agricultural commodity such as wheat would not endanger the inter-
national peace. 1" Since these commodities are widely available in an
almost perfectly competitive international market, any one State's boy-
cott of another would not deprive the target State of the good, but
would instead only force it to seek out alternative suppliers which it
should be able to obtain with little difficulty.
On the other hand, if a group of States join together so that the
coalition controls a very substantial amount of the market in a particu-
lar commodity and that group of States acts collectively to embargo
another State, there is a much higher chance that their action would
endanger international peace. This principle relating to the combina-
tion of States was addressed early on in this debate; Hyde and Wehle
stated in their 1933 article:
Suppose two or more countries combine to cut off all commercial inter-
course with another that is singled out for penalization .... It is the
uniting or combining of two or more States that transforms conduct to
which a single country might fairly have recourse, into conduct which at
once attains a sinister aspect, and from which the country against which
it is directed may oftentimes justly complain. 145
However, this vision of the law of economic diplomacy was rejected by
some scholars on the theory that some large States would be able to
inflict more damage to others by acting unilaterally than a combina-
tion of a number of small States acting collectively. 46
There is some force to this argument, but the answer to it is not
that there is no utility in defining the legality of this sort of State con-
duct with respect to the combination and collusion of States. Instead,
the answer is to apply an "essential commodities" doctrine to individ-
144. When the United States launched its grain embargo of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R.
was able to find many alternative suppliers such as Argentina and Australia.
145. Hyde & Wehle, supra note 8, at 4.
146. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 291 (2d ed.
1959); Blum, supra note 5, at 7.
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ual State action that is reminiscent of the essential facilities doctrine in
U.S. antitrust law.' 47 If a singular State itself controls a very signifi-
cant portion of the market for a particular good as either a producer
or consumer, and access to that market is essential to the economic
well-being of the boycotted or embargoed State, then the measures the
acting State has taken are essentially equivalent to the danger that a
combination of States presents to the international peace and should
therefore be treated as illegal.
Yet, not all actions of States in combination with one another
should be adjudged illegal under the Charter and its principles. In-
stead, a rule of reason should be applied to State action in determining
whether its actions actually enhance or endanger international peace.
For instance, if a State has exhibited hostile actions toward another
State, it would be perfectly reasonable, and more likely to enhance the
international peace, for States to combine together to deprive that
State of certain military and strategic goods. Such activity would
clearly be legal under the standard of State action proposed in this
Note.
This standard is one that focuses on the combination of States with
significant market power and States that alone possess a significant
market share for a product (or consumer market) that is essential to
the attainment of the economic survival of another State. However,
the same "essential good" or "essential market" approach would not
necessarily be appropriate for the case of the combination of States, in
that the combination itself makes the action highly suspect and is
more likely to endanger the international peace than the unilateral ac-
tion of most States.
This formulation of the rule is consistent with the actual reaction
of States in the past. The primary example was the Arab Oil Embargo
where there was a combination of States with substantial market
power1 48 attempting to deny certain States a commodity - oil -
which is essential to the modern industrially based economies. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the action of the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) caused a real threat to the
international peace with certain First World actors advocating the use
of force as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter as
a result of the embargo.1
49
147. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 736.1-736.2
(Supp. 1988).
148. OAPEC is thought to control more than 52% of the known world petroleum reserves.
ABDULAZIZ AL-SOWAYEGH, ARAB PETROPOLITIcs 3 (1984).
149. See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 5, at 416-17.
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State Economic Action
Finally, it is important to consider the amount of restriction that
should be placed on the exercise of economic pressure in States' inter-
national relations. The Charter, much to its credit, has effectively
eliminated the legal use of physical force except for the limited pur-
poses of self defense. Therefore, States have been deprived of the pri-
mary means which they possessed in the pre-Charter legal scheme to
settle serious conflicts with one another (i.e., resort to war). While the
effectiveness of the United Nations may be increasing, it is not yet an
institution that is capable of solving the most severe international dis-
putes (a primary example being the Arab-Israeli conflict), despite the
powers accorded to the Security Council under the. Charter. There-
fore, States must be able to take certain economic actions against one
another as a sort of safety valve. If States are totally proscribed from
taking nonviolent acts of retorsion or reprisals against one another, a
substantial risk exists that they will simply throw off the restraints of
international law and return to the state of anarchy in the field of the
use of force.
CONCLUSION
The legal regulation of the use of economic diplomacy is one of the
most unclear areas of international law. This Note attempts to explain
some views on the subject in order to clarify the prime issues relating
to its resolution. However, a great need remains for the international
community to adopt clearer norms of behavior in this area of State
practice than can be inferred from the very general statements of the
U.N. Charter and the various other collaterally related international
instruments relating to the issue.
All the States of the international community should come to-
gether to work out mutually acceptable norms of conduct in the form
of a specific code that respects both the sovereignty of States and the
ability of other States to vindicate international law through the use of
economic diplomacy. As long as the current situation remains un-
changed, the legality of such actions will be open to an interminable
debate with little or no clear rules, making it impossible for States to
conform their conduct to unambiguous and predictable legal rules.
The extreme confusion in this area of the law is a serious and sub-
stantial threat to the maintenance of the international peace given the
potentially high level of tension that is often precipitated by the exer-
cise of economic diplomacy. As long as the "rules of the game" in the
exercise of such actions remain unclear, States will continue to harbor
very wide differences about the limits of acceptable economic conduct.
These types of diverse views of the legality of conduct are a prescrip-
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tion for misunderstanding, international tension, and perhaps disaster,
which may be avoided through the codification of such rules by the
world community.
